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Abstract
The authors employ Ogburn’s (1922) concept of cultural lag to gain insight into why Donald Trump’s supporters
voted for him in the 2016 Presidential election. Rocha, Sabetta, and Clark posit that economic and technological
changes created a sense of ill being, or malaise, among a large portion of the white working class and that this
malaise made voters unusually susceptible to the populist themes of the Trump candidacy. The authors analyze
Gallup’s (2017) “State of the States” poll results for 2016 to examine the degree to which Trump’s margin of victory
over Clinton in the 50 states (data from The Cook Political Report 2017) can be explained by the variables of 1)
the percentage of state residents who identify as Republican or who identify as independent but say they lean
Republican and 2) a state’s score on Gallup’s overall “Well-Being” index.” This index is comprised of five elements
of well-being that are the core components of the best possible life: purpose, social, financial, community and
physical.” The authors report that, at the state level, once the degree to which a population identified as Republican
was controlled, there was a strong, negative correlation between its overall well being and Trump’s electoral
margins. Rocha, Sabetta, and Clark use the American National Election study data from 2016 and 2012, at the
individual level, to show that the 2016 election was unusually influenced by attitudes that constituted a kind of
cultural backlash to progressive viewpoints about blacks, immigrants, gays and lesbians, and women. The data
show that these attitudes had stronger controlled associations with a vote for Trump than measures of current
economic and educational deprivation.
Keywords: cultural lag, economic insecurity, cultural backlash, populism
INTRODUCTION
Asked why Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential
election, pundits give about as many answers as there
are, well, pundits. Answers include, for example,
Comey’s announcement of the reopening of the Clinton
investigation; Hillary Clinton’s poor candidacy; Mrs.
Clinton’s e-mail scandal; Russian interference in the
election process; the fact that Presidents are not elected
by popular vote; Trump’s supporters’ addiction to “The
Apprentice;” and so on.
Although these answers may each have some validity,
none is particularly sociological. And none feels like
an adequate answer to the basic question: what made

a sufficient slice of the American populace so ready
and perhaps eager to vote for a political novice, with
some evident peccadillos, that any of these peculiarities,
or even some combination of them, could tip the
scale? This really is the central question of this paper,
one that we address through two lenses: a cultural lag
lens and a cultural backlash lens. The former leads
us to believe that support for Trump’s candidacy was
born out of economic insecurity in a substantial part
of the electorate. The latter, that it was the result of
a resentment of a “silent revolution” in attitudes, a
revolution that deprived many whites of their sense of
privilege in American society.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Using the “Cultural Lag” Lens
We thought that the theme of this issue of SBG,
cultural lag, might hold the clue to Donald Trump’s
electoral success. We knew that at least one faction
of Trump supporters (e.g., white working-class men
and their families) had experienced a buffeting by the
winds of economic and technological change. While
such changes also affected working-class people of
other racial and ethnic backgrounds, white workingclass men and their families were more susceptible to
Trump’s campaign themes about job creation and job
security.
The sources of this buffeting have been well
documented. By the 1960s, in fact, the switch to
a knowledge-based economy in the United States
had begun and the industrial economy began to
thin. Managers and engineers, always interested in
increasing productivity, produced automated factories
that employed fewer people. By the 1970s, corporations
began to replace old factories with new ones in countries
with low-cost labor. Initially this loss of manufacturing
jobs hit black men hardest, but by the 1980s the losses
hit less-educated whites as well (Kenschaft, Clark and
Ciambrone 2016: 41-42). The more recent acceleration
of computing power, what Thomas Friedman (2016) calls
“the supernova,” promises to threaten the traditional
working-class job market even more.
The effects of all this economic and technological
change have been uneven in the United States, as
elsewhere. Real family incomes for the top 20 percent
of families rose by a little over 75 percent between 1967
and 2013. Meanwhile those for the next 40 percent
rose by less than 30 percent, and have actually fallen
substantially since 2000, and those for the next 40
percent have risen much less, and also fallen since 2000
(Reeves 2015). Social scientists as politically disparate as
Charles Murray (2012) and Robert Putnam (2015) have
pointed to an increasing bifurcation in the experiences,
opportunities, and prospects for children between what
Murray calls “The New Upper Class” and the “New
Lower Class.” Murray demonstrates convincingly that
this divide is as significant among white Americans as it
is among any other group.
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The relationship between the income inequality
and opportunity inequality has not been simple or
instantaneous. Murray (2012) and Putnam (2015) both
suggest that it took decades for economic troubles
“to undermine family structures and community
supports” (Putnam 2015: 228). As marriage became less
common and divorce more common among the “new
lower class,” children experienced gaps in parenting,
developing lower commitments to education and lower
chances for intergenerational mobility. Fear regarding
and resentment for these situations was natural, as
well as for government actors who continued, as one
of Hochschild’s (2016: 52)) respondents put it, “come
down on the little guy,” over-regulating the little guy, but
under-regulating guys at the top.
In his 2015 book, Our Kids: The American Dream
in Crisis, Putnam under-scored the potential for
“antidemocratic extremism” that the presence of a
new lower class, faced increasingly with few personal
opportunities, but also few opportunities for their
children, poses. As he put it:
[U]nder severe economic and international pressures . .
. the “inert” mass might suddenly prove highly volatile and
open to manipulation by anti-democratic demagogues at the
ideological extremes (pp. 239-240).

So one view of Trump’s victory suggests that
many of his supporters were victims of long-term
economic upheaval in the U. S., seeking to express
their dissatisfaction with the way the country had
left them and their children behind. They voted for
Trump, according to this view, because he spoke to
their economic insecurities and promised to create
the jobs that would enable them to once again achieve
respectable middle-class status for themselves and a
hopeful future for their children. An added benefit
was that Donald Trump promised to shake up the
Washington establishment.
More generally, Donald Trump has been viewed as
embodying the characteristics of a populist candidate,
one who extols the wisdom of “ordinary people” ahead
of the views of elites (e.g., media pundits and elected
politicians). Populism, according to Inglehart and
Norris (2016: 6-7) is a philosophy that often favors
the personal power of charismatic leaders, preferring
direct majoritarian democratic rule over a system of
checks and balances. Donald Trump’s embrace of these
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principles, the cultural lag perspective implies, made groups who seem, through affirmative action programs
him particularly attractive to people with less education, of the federal government, to have been given a leg up
lower levels of income and wealth, and a greater sense in colleges and universities, jobs and welfare programs.
that the economy was failing because it promised to Hochschild summarizes:
address their economic insecurities.

Women, immigrants, refugees, public sector workers—

Therefore, the cultural lag perspective led us to where will it end? Your money is running through a liberal
propose the following four hypotheses:
sympathy sieve you don’t control or agree with. These are
Hypothesis 1: People with lower incomes would have
been more likely to vote for Trump than people with higher
incomes.
Hypothesis 2: People with less wealth would have been
more likely to vote for Trump than people with more wealth.
Hypothesis 3: People with less education would have
been more likely to vote for Trump than people with more
education.
Hypothesis 4: People who felt the economy was doing
badly would have been more likely to vote for Trump than
people who felt the economy was doing well.

Using the “Cultural Backlash” Lens
“Cultural backlash” refers to a reaction against
progressive cultural movements. The cultural backlash
perspective can be seen as focusing on second-level,
attitudinal implications of economic and technological
change, especially for people who may previously
have seen themselves as privileged in society, but now
feel victimized by liberal movements and attitudes.
This perspective suggests that there has been a “silent
revolution” in values in many Western nations,
coinciding with the rise of knowledge-based economies
(e.g., Inglehart 1977), that has been associated with a
rise of multiculturalism, advocacy for environmental
protection, human rights, and gender equality. Like
many such “revolutions,” this one has inspired a
backlash most particularly among those who have seen
their privilege and status challenged by liberals and by
economic change. These revolutions have left many
whites feeling, as Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) book title
states, Strangers in Their Own Land.
Hochschild’s qualitative research into the lives and
convictions of conservatives, who, in her study, were
largely white, uncovers deep-seated fears of being
culturally eclipsed. Her Louisiana respondents did in
fact fear economic decline, but were conceivably even
more motivated by resentments about “line cutters,”

opportunities you’d have loved to have had in your day—and
either you should have had them when you were young or
the young shouldn’t be getting them now. It’s not fair (2016:
137).

Hochschild is careful about labeling her respondents,
and by extension other, primarily white, conservatives,
as racist, sexist, anti-immigrant or homophobic. Many,
she implies, probably are racist by definitions used by
sociologists—e.g., believers “in a natural hierarchy that
places blacks at the bottom” (2016: 147). She points out,
however, that most are explicitly not racist by their own
definitions of the word—people who use the “N” word
or who hate blacks. We too would like to avoid such
labels.
Donald Trump spoke to the sense of unfairness felt
by many “new lower class” whites. He openly criticized
immigrants from Mexico and Muslim countries, and
was cheered. Openly demanded that “Black Lives
Matter” protesters be kicked out of his rallies, and
garnered vocal crowd support. Hochschild makes this
observation about a rally she observed:
He [Trump] was throwing off not only a set of “politically
correct” attitudes, but a set of feeling rules—that is, a set of
ideas about the right way to feel regarding blacks, women,
immigrants, gays . . . (2016: 227).

The cultural backlash perspective led us to propose a
number of other hypotheses about the 2016 presidential
election. Specifically, we came to expect:
Hypothesis 5: People who feel that blacks have not been
particularly disadvantaged are more likely than others to
have voted for Trump.
Hypothesis 6: People who would like to halt immigration
into the country are more likely than others to have voted for
Trump.
Hypothesis 7: People who feel that discrimination against
gays and lesbians is tolerable are more likely than others to
have voted for Trump.
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Hypothesis 8: People who feel that discrimination against
women is tolerable are more likely to have voted for Trump
than others.

Our reading of the cultural lag and cultural backlash
perspectives together led us to believe that, at the state
level, those state populations expressing the greatest
overall well being would be less likely to vote for Trump
than those expressing the least overall well being.
Hence, we proposed our last (ninth) hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9: At the state level, Trump’s margin of
victory will have been inversely related to the proportion
of the population expressing a sense of overall well being,
even once the proportion of the population of the population
classifying itself as Republican is controlled.

RESEARCH APPROACH and PRINCIPAL
VARIABLES
This article is based primarily on secondary analysis
of two timely data sets: Gallup’s (2017) “State of the
States” poll results for 2016 and the American National
Election Study (ANES) for 2016 and 2012.1 We use the
Gallup data to determine the degree to which Trump’s
margin of victory (or defeat) over Clinton in the 50
states (data from The Cook Political Report, 2017) can
be explained by two variables: the percentage of state
residents who identify as Republican or who identify
as independent but say they lean toward Republican
and a state’s score on Gallup’s overall “Well-Being”
index, “made up of five elements of well-being that are
the core components of the best possible life: purpose,
social, financial, community and physical.” Our goal
is to ascertain the degree to which a lack of “wellbeing,” the closest measure of state-wide despair we
have found, can account for Trump’s success, above and
beyond what could have expected based on the political
identification of states’ populations.
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rather than at the state, level may have contributed to
Trump’s electoral success. We choose indicators based
on their availability in both the 2012 presidential
election, involving primarily Mitt Romney and Barack
Obama and in order to estimate their relative salience
in the 2016 election. Comparing the two elections is
crucial for determining the degree to which certain
characteristics and attitudes stand out in the 2016
election. Thus, for instance, even if we find that a
concern about immigrants distinguished Trump voters
from Clinton voters, we cannot be sure that this attitude
was particularly salient in the 2016 election unless we
can determine that it was less important in previous
elections.
Our dependent variable in the 2016 election is
whether a respondent voted for Clinton (coded 0) or
Trump (coded 1). Our dependent variable in the 2012
election is whether s/he voted for Obama (coded 0) or
Romney (coded 1).
We use four measures of economic status and possible
insecurity as independent variables. Three of these tap
respondents’ economic condition and the fourth, an
attitude towards the economy. The first independent
variable is a measure of family income (INCOME).2
The second independent variable is a rough measure
of wealth, based on whether a respondent claimed to
own stock or not (STOCK). The third independent
variable is a measure of education (EDUCATION).3 The
fourth independent variable is a measure of economic
condition (ECONOMY).4 The cultural lag perspective
leads us to expect that people with lower family income,
without stocks, with less education and with negative
ratings of the economy are more likely to have voted for
Trump than people with higher incomes, with stocks,
with more education and with positive ratings of the
economy.
We also have four measures of the degree to which
respondents are gripped by a negative reaction to
progressive value changes—that is, are part of a cultural

Since 1948, ANES has employed a sample of
American voters in every presidential election in order 2
INCOME has 28 categories, ranging from “under $5,000” to
to help researchers determine the characteristics and “$250,000 or more.”
attitudes of voters that led to the election result in
each presidential election. We use the ANES data to 3 EDUCATION has five categories, ranging from “less than a high
determine how various indicators of voter economic school credential” to “a graduate degree.”
insecurity and cultural backlash, at the individual, 4
The ANES data were available through Berkeley University’s
(2017) “Survey Documentation and Analysis” website.
1

ECONOMY is operationalized by a respondent’s rating of the
economy on a five-category scale from “very good” to “very bad.”
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backlash against certain categories of people. One Republicans, whites, males, older voters, and people
measure has to do with the degree to which they disagree who said religion was important would be more likely
with the statement that “Blacks have gotten less than to vote for Trump than non-Republicans, non-whites,
they deserve” (BLACKS). A second measure focuses females, younger voters and people who said religion
on the degree to which they think the media should was not important.
pay less attention to discrimination against women
(WOMEN).5 A third measure is whether they say “no”
RESULTS
to the question “should laws protect gays and lesbians
from job discrimination” (GAYS). And the fourth
We report results from Pearson correlation and
measure, a four-category scale measuring the degree
to which respondents think that government should linear regression analyses for overwhelming theoretical
define unauthorized immigrants as felons and send considerations, despite the fact that many of our
them back to their home countries (IMMIGRANTS). variables do not meet the assumptions required of such
9
Unfortunately, in regard to measuring anti-immigrant statistical techniques. Normally, it would be preferable
feeling, this last variable does not have the greatest to use logit or probit regression analysis, for instance,
face validity in the 2016 ANES survey. An alternative when the dependent variable is dichotomous, especially
measure of this variable was available in the 2016. We when one of the categories of the variable is relatively
could not use the alternative variable because there was rare. But rarity is not a problem for the dependent
no comparable indicator present in the 2012 survey.6 variables in this analysis: all four candidates—Trump,
However, analyses not presented here suggest that the Clinton, Romney and Obama—received substantial
more valid, alternative measure of anti-immigrant proportions of the votes. And simple linear regression
feeling actually shows a stronger association with provides statistics—in this case, standardized regression
presidential choice than IMMIGRANT, so using the coefficients (betas)—that enable the comparison of
variable IMMIGRANT in our analysis probably offers the strength of controlled associations of various
a conservative estimate of the degree to which anti- independent variables on the dependent variable. These
are crucial comparisons for this study. In analyses not
immigrant sentiment drove Trump voters.
reported in this paper, we have done logit regression
We use five control variables in our analyses: political and find that results are stable over the two types of
party affiliation; race; gender; age; and the importance regression regime (i.e., for simple linear and logit
of religion to the respondent.7 Republicans were regression).
undoubtedly more likely to vote for Trump than voters
Our initial research question had to do with how
with other political identifications.8 We expected that
much of Trump’s margins at the state level, which is,
5
We want to point out that the wording of this statement may after all, how elections are decided, could be accounted
needlessly confuse voter attitudes towards women with their
for in terms of general malaise, dissatisfaction or
attitudes towards the media as well as their attitudes towards
Hillary Clinton, a female candidate. However, we found no more despair among the electorate. We therefore regressed
reliable indicator of attitudes towards women in the 2016 and 2012 Trump’s margin at the state level on two variables:
one, the percentage of state residents self-identifying
6
One variable (available in 2016), based on a question about what as Republican; the other, the index measuring overall
should happen to United States immigration levels (from “increase
wellbeing. As Table 1 suggests, once the percentage
them a lot” to “decrease them a lot”) does not confuse, as the
variable IMMIGRANTS might be seen to do, attitudes towards
immigration with attitudes towards illegal immigration.

Political party affiliation is coded as Republican = 1 and not
Republican = 0. Self-identified race is coded as 1 = white and 0 =
not white. Gender (GENDER) is coded as 1 = female and 0 = male.
Age (AGE) is coded as age in years; and the importance of religion
to the respondent (RELIGION) is coded as 1 = religion important
and 0 = religion not important.
7

We had a choice between two variables: one measured the
degree to which voters considered themselves Republican (with
strong Republicans being on one end of a 7-category scale and
strong Democrats being on the other); one measured whether they
identified as Republican or not. As it turns out, findings do not
substantially differ when either indicator is used, but we use the
latter in the analyses presented here.
8

Quite a few of the variables we analyze are not measured at the
interval level and those that are, even our dependent variable,
the candidate for whom people voted, are typically two-category
dummy variables.
9
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of Republicans is controlled, the association between
Trump’s margin and index of overall wellbeing was
strong, significant and negative (beta = -.19). (See
Table1.)
Table 1. Regression of Trump Margin by State on
the Percentage of the State Population Reporting
That It Is Republican (REPUBLICAN) and Overall
Wellbeing Index (WELLBEING)
Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)
REPUBLICAN		
WELLBEING		

.91***
-.19***

N of States		

50

Adjusted R-square

.92

However, if “ill being,” the opposite of “well being,”
was a significant predictor of Trump’s margin of victory
at the state level, the question arises as to what was the
nature of this “ill being” at the individual level. The
cultural lag and the cultural backlash perspectives on
support for populism provide three testable hypotheses.
Table 2 shows fundamental support, even while it also
reveals some surprises. We begin with our control
variables in the regression analyses presented here.
Comparison between the 2016 and 2012 elections
suggests that, at the zero-order level, REPUBLICAN (r
in 2016 = .61; r in 2012 = .64) was slightly less salient in
the 2016 than in the 2012 election. Race, gender and age
had about the same salience in the 2016 election as they
did in the 2012 election. But the importance of religion
to a voter was actually considerably more salient in the
2016 election (r = .26) than it was in 2012 (r = .11).
People who defined themselves as religious were much
more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton. They were
even more likely to do that than religious voters were to
vote for Romney than Obama.

6
hypothesis that income affected the 2016 result, if it
were not for the fact that, by contrast, Romney voters
tended to have considerably more income than Obama
voters (r =.14). As a general rule, Republicans tend to
be higher earners than Democrats. The 2016 election
proved to be the rule’s exception, suggesting that many
income-strapped voters did in fact vote for Trump.
Similarly, voters without a stock portfolio were only a
little more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton in the
2016 election (r for STOCKS = -.07), but, compared to
the non-existent relationship in the 2012 election (r =
.00), this difference suggests that Trump’s candidacy was
relatively effective at drawing voters with little wealth.
The other two hypotheses derived from the cultural
lag perspective are also supported, but, in this case, the
support is somewhat undermined by the comparison
with 2012 results. It is widely believed, for instance,
that less educated voters were more likely to vote for
Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between
EDUCATION and a Trump vote (r = -.12) supports
this belief. But the fact that the correlation between
EDUCATION and a Romney vote was stronger (r =
-.16) suggests that education may not have been quite
as telling in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012
election. It is also a common belief that those who felt
the economy was doing badly were more likely to vote
for Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between
ECONOMY and a Trump vote (r = .48) would appear
to be strong support for this view. But, when one
sees that the correlation between a Romney vote and
ECONOMY in 2012 was even stronger (r = .58), one
is led to entertain the possibility that disappointment
with the economy’s performance does not completely
explain Trump’s success, or at least was not as salient a
factor in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012 election.

In contrast, the correlation coefficients reported in
Table 2 show both absolute and relative support for all
of the hypotheses derived from the cultural backlash
perspective. BLACKS, measuring the extent to which
voters disagreed with the statement that “Blacks have
gotten less than they deserve,” was strongly correlated
with voting for Trump (r = .54), even more strongly
Table 2 also offers support for hypotheses derived than it was with votes for Romney when he was running
from the cultural lag perspective. However, this support against a black incumbent whom some Americans
is sometimes only evident when one contrasts the resented (r = .47). Voting for Trump was more highly
2016 results with the 2012 results. Thus, the negligible correlated with disagreement with the feeling that gays
correlation between INCOME and a vote for Trump and lesbians should not be discriminated against (r =
in 2016 (r =.01) would not immediately support the .30) than voting for Romney was (.25), even though, in
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both cases, the correlation is relatively high. Negative (See Table 3.)
feelings about undocumented immigrants was much
more strongly correlated with a vote for Trump (r=.44) DISCUSSION
than it was with a vote for Romney (.28), though in
neither case was the correlation weak. And negative
We find evidence that voting for Trump in the 2016
feelings about media attention to discrimination against election may have been substantially motivated by
women was much more strongly associated with a vote sentiments resulting from economic and technological
for Trump (.49) than it was with a vote for Romney changes that have gotten ahead of American society’s
(.35), although, again, in both cases the correlation is ability to adapt—i.e., from cultural lag. We argue that
strikingly high. (See Table 2.)
the long-term disruption of the job market for the
working class, especially the white working class, has left
It is, of course, possible that some of the insights a considerable portion of the American electorate with
available from Table 2 would require modification when a sense of malaise. Moreover, our state-level analysis
we examine the associations of independent variables suggests that this malaise, this feeling of ill being, was a
with voting behavior, controlling for other variables. strong correlate of Trump’s margins.
Table 3 presents the results of regression analyses and, in
fact, it suggests that some of the insights provided by the
Our individual-level analyses suggest support for
correlation analyses do need to be reconsidered. Thus, the notion that Trump’s success had more to do with
for instance, when all other variables are controlled, resentments that may have been fostered by economic
voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic disruption than by lingering economic disadvantages
candidate in both the 2016 and the 2012 elections if themselves. In terms of income and stockholdings, for
religion was important to them (beta for 2016 = -.09, instance, Trump voters were not different from Clinton
for 2012 = -.12).
voters, although their relative economic disadvantage,
compared to Romney voters in 2012, is notable.
Crucially, though, the regression analyses continue Relatively speaking, they were slightly less educated
to provide solid support for the cultural backlash than Romney voters, but not significantly less educated
hypotheses, while they provide more ambiguous support than Clinton voters, when other variables in our analysis
for the cultural lag hypotheses. Thus, the 2016 betas for were controlled. They were much more likely than
BLACKS, IMMIGRANTS, GAYS, and WOMEN (.17, Clinton voters to see the economy as worse off than it
.12, .06 and .16, respectively) are all stronger than their was the previous year, but, compared to Romney voters
counterparts in 2012 (.15, .08, .00, and .08, respectively) in 2012, they were not quite as adamant on this point.
and statistically significant. Trump voters seem to have
been unusually unsympathetic to the condition of
We want to point to limitations of our study,
blacks, undocumented immigrants, gays and lesbians, however, that make suspect its apparent negligible to
and women.
weak support for the view that Trump supporters have
been more disadvantaged by economic upheaval than
On the other hand, support for the cultural lag Clinton supporters. First, and perhaps most important,
hypotheses is less strong in the regression analyses than we have no data about the past workplace experiences of
it appeared to be in the correlation analyses. None of the voters in the 2016. We cannot say, as a result, what kind
betas for INCOME, STOCKS, and EDUCATION (.00, of dislocations voters may have experienced during the
-.01, and -.02, respectively) is statistically significant, Great Recession of 2008/2009, or over the past forty
and only the one for INCOME suggests much more or fifty years—and, hence, how these dislocations may
relative economic deprivation among Trump voters than have been related to their vote in the 2016 Presidential
its counterpart (beta = .05) for the 2012 election. The election. Second, we do not have access to data about
beta for ECONOMY (.20) in the 2016 election strongly whether voters were unemployed or non-participants
suggests that Trump voters felt more disappointment in the labor force—both better indicators of current
over the economy’s performance than Clinton voters economic insecurity than any measures we were able to
did, but it also suggests less relative disappointment employ. Third, our finding of little difference between
than its counterpart (beta = .30) does for Romney Trump and Clinton voters in terms of income, wealth
voters, compared to Obama voters, in the 2012 election. and education is actually fairly striking, given the
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Table 2. Correlates of Trump and Romney Votes
Trump/Clinton
2016

Table 3. Regression of Trump and Romney Votes on
Other Variables

Romney/Obama
		
2012

Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)
Trump/Clinton
Romney/Obama
2016
2012

REPUBLICAN

.61***

.64***

REPUBLICAN

.33***		

.35***

WHITE		

.33***

.34***

WHITE		

.14***		

.16***

GENDER		

-.06**

-.07***

AGE		

.13***

.11***

RELIGION

.26***

.11***

INCOME

.01		

.14***
.00

GENDER		

-.02		

-.03

AGE			

.03*		

.02

RELIGION 		

-.09***

INCOME 		

.00 			

-.12***
.05**

STOCKS 		

-.01 		

-.04*

EDUCATION 		

-.02 			

ECONOMY 		

.20***		

.30***

BLACKS		

.17*** 		

.15***

STOCKS 		

-.07***

EDUCATION

-.12***

-.16***

ECONOMY		

.48***

.58***

BLACKS 		

.54***

.47***

IMMIGRANTS

.12***		

.08***

IMMIGRANTS

.44***

.28***

GAYS			

.06***		

.00

GAYS			
		
WOMEN		

.30***

.25***		

WOMEN		

.16***		

.08***

.49***

.35***

N			

2211			

1844

Adjusted R-square

.61			

.61

Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 =
1,860. An * indicates significance at the .05 level; A ** indicates
significance at the .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the
.001 level. Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1=Republican; 0 = not
Republican; WHITE: 1 = white; 0 = non-white; GENDER:
1= female ; 0=male; RELIGION: 1= religion important; 0 =
religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks; 0 = owns no
stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that
economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater
disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than
they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more
agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are
felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates
more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should
not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher
values indicate greater agreement with feeling that media
should pay less attention to discrimination against women.

8

.01

Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 =
1,860. An * indicates significance at the .05 level; A ** indicates
significance at the .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the
.001 level. Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1= Republican; 0 = not
Republican; WHITE: 1 = white; 0 = non-white; GENDER:
1= female ; 0 = male; RELIGION: 1 = religion important; 0 =
religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks; 0 = owns no
stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that
economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater
disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than
they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more
agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are
felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates
more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should
not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher values
indicate greater agreement with feeling that media should pay
less attention to discrimination against women.
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historic tendency of Republicans to be richer and better
We find more evidence for hypotheses based upon the
educated than Democrats. It may actually mean that cultural backlash perspective. Trump voters expressed
more of the poorer and less-educated voters voted for greater resentments about blacks, immigrants, women
Trump than typically vote for Republican candidates. and gays and lesbians than did Clinton voters and
Nonetheless, to the extent that our indicators do tap these differences were considerably greater than similar
the current economic conditions of voters, we can say ones that distinguished voters in the 2012 presidential
that we were unable to turn up much evidence that election. Unfortunately, the data we analyzed cannot
those conditions did much to distinguish Trump from help us discern whether these resentments would have
Clinton voters.
been detectable before the Trump candidacy or whether
the Trump candidacy was a necessary condition for
What we did find considerable evidence for is such resentments becoming notable and noted.
the view that Trump voters were more likely to
express resentments, conceivably resulting from past
economic challenges, about various minority and/or LITERATURE CITED
marginalized groups than Clinton voters. This has been
true of supporters of previous Republican candidates, Friedman, Thomas. 2016. Thank You for Being Late: An
compared to those of their Democratic opponents, as
Optimist’s Guide in the Age of Accelerations. New York:
our data on the 2012 election affirm. But the differences
Ferrar, Straus and Girous.
between the 2016 and 2012 elections suggest that
Trump voters were unusually likely to have negative Gallup. 2017. State of the States. Retrieved June 2, 2017.
attitudes towards blacks, immigrants, gays and lesbians,
(http://www.gallup.com/poll/125066/state-states.aspx)
and women, even compared to Republican-candidate
supporters in previous elections. While we cannot say Hochschild, Arlie, 2016. Strangers in Their Own Land. New
for sure that it was only white voters for Trump who
York: The New Press.
had these attitudes, the results do constitute support
for Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) general contention that Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. The Silent Revolution. Princeton:
Trump voters felt resentment towards groups that made
Princeton University Press.
them feel like “strangers in their own land.”
CONCLUSION
In general, using the cultural lag perspective, we find
relatively little support for the contention that Trump
voters were distinguished from Clinton voters in terms
of their economic or educational levels. We find more
support for the conclusion, also derived from the
cultural lag perspective, that they were distinguished
by a relatively bleak view of the economy. However,
we were surprised to see that their bleak view of the
economy did less to distinguish them from Clinton
voters than it did to distinguish Romney from Obama
voters in the 2012 election. Future research, however,
might examine the question of whether Trump voters
have experienced more economic and/or educational
deprivation sometime in their past than Clinton
voters. Such research might provide a truer test of the
cultural lag perspective than we were able to achieve in
our analysis, limited as we were to measures of voters’
current economic and educational situations.
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